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Dunning 1 
Do we really want to say that ∞ exists only in the way that unicorns do, that it's all a 
matter of our manipulating abstractions until the noun 'infinity' has no real referent? 
—David Foster Wallace 
 
Infinite Jest borrows its name from a line in Hamlet: "Alas, poor Yorick. I knew him, 
Horatio—a fellow of infinite jest" (5.1.171-2). While alluding to this canonical 
meditation on death, the novel's title also points to the infinity of mathematics, an esoteric 
concept that appears again and again in Wallace's writing. What can the mingling of 
Hamlet's pain and madness with set theory's abstraction mean? It seems surprising that 
Wallace's disappointment in "our intelligentsia [who] distrust strong belief, open 
conviction" (Lobster 272) leads him to embrace the emotionless sterility of pure 
mathematics. But Wallace always humanizes the questions that fascinate him. When he 
asks about the ontological status of infinity, he is not just talking about set theory. The 
ambiguous distinction between real and virtual arises everywhere in Infinite Jest. For 
Wallace, our ability to live in an increasingly virtual world depends on our ability to 
locate and assert reality. As technology and consumer culture daily make that project 
more obscure, mathematics is relevant as a field on which the question of reality has 
always had obvious import. 
Several critics have offered readings of Wallace that begin to interpret his fascination 
with mathematics, but we lack a clear and comprehensive picture of how the 
mathematical shapes his writing. I will argue that a lucid picture of Wallace's math is 
prerequisite to any proper interpretation of his thought. In a chapter of his book Machine-
Age Comedy, Michael North analyzes the humor in Infinite Jest and also engages with 
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mathematics. He examines both the math in that novel and in Everything and More, 
Wallace's book-length layman's introduction to transfinite arithmetic, the branch of 
mathematics that deals with numbers that are somehow 'bigger than infinity.' North's 
reading of Wallace's comedy is sharp and compelling, but his treatment of mathematics is 
cursory. He acknowledges the centrality of math in Wallace, especially of the notion of 
recursion, but he simplifies Wallace's math to a "tension within Infinite Jest of two quite 
different infinities" (181). This formulation reduces transfinite arithmetic, an esoteric 
topic to which Wallace devotes an entire book, to a digestible binary. While certainly the 
major tensions in Infinite Jest do not depend on the technical details of an erudite theory, 
I would claim that they do arise in relation to Wallace's sophisticated understanding of 
the history of mathematics, a history that North obscures with his simplifying notion of 
two opposing infinities. 
N. Katherine Hayles offers a perceptive reading of Infinite Jest in her essay "The 
Illusion of Autonomy and the Fact of Recursivity," but she imposes a specialized 
vocabulary on the text, obscuring Wallace's particular ideas and concerns. In Hayles's 
formulation, Infinite Jest demonstrates that "If the problem originates in the presumption 
of autonomy that is the founding principle for the liberal humanist self, then nothing less 
than a reconceptualization of subjectivity can offer a solution" (693). The 'autonomy' 
against which Hayles writes corresponds to a privileging of the self that indeed horrifies 
Wallace, and he does place his hope in a rethinking of the self in relation to something 
bigger outside of it. For Hayles, reconceptualizing subjectivity consists in trading one 
abstraction for another: from 'autonomy' to 'recursivity,' or "recognizing the profound 
interconnections that bind us all together" (696). But Wallace portrays the necessary act 
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as a transcendence, a near-mystic moment of utter redefinition that surpasses simply 
perceiving one structure in place of another. I contend that math's role as the model of 
transcendence by redefinition is an essential part of Wallace's formulation. Hayles reads 
him in terms of the complex systems and virtual ecologies that are the true topic of her 
essay. She enlists Wallace in her own project quite well, but she does not really capture 
his arguments. 
To my mind, Paul Giles' essay "Sentimental Posthumanism: David Foster Wallace" is 
the most helpful reading of Wallace available. Giles situates Wallace in a broader 
conception of posthumanism, a strand of theory largely pioneered by Hayles in her book 
How We Became Posthuman. He observes: 
[Wallace] takes the psychological fragmentation endemic to posthumanist cultural 
landscapes as a fait accompli, but chooses to traverse this terrain with a wide 
variety of philosophical references, thereby expanding the posthumanist idea 
beyond the narrow technocratic circle of the cyborg manifesto and showing how, 
at the turn of the twenty-first century, a posthumanist sensibility has filtered into 
the everyday consciousness of American life. (330) 
Posthumanist theory often revolves around specialized discussions in computer science 
and related fields. Wallace adopts its philosophical context and exports it to a 
nontechnical consideration of life in the posthumanist age. Giles summarizes this context 
as "a condition of confusion where the human sensibility is left uncertain about its 
epistemological status… the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman is 
becoming ever less self-evident" (328). Giles goes on to identify Wallace's use of 
"dialectics between a discourse of dehumanization [and] nostalgia" (335). His notion of 
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Wallace as a dialectician is especially useful. However, Giles only briefly mentions 
Everything and More, then pauses to acknowledge that "Infinite Jest also plays 
knowingly with the idea of infinity as a rhetorical trope with wider applications beyond 
pure science" (334). But his analysis is not concerned with mathematics. I will argue that 
Wallace's project, which Giles aptly describes as "a creatively sentimental redescription 
of posthumanism" (341), arises from his consideration of mathematics and its history, 
and derives its structure from that tradition. Any interpretation of Wallace's aims as a 
posthumanist must proceed from an adequate understanding of his role as a pop-historian 
and cultural interpreter of math. Wallace looks to the treatment of paradox and 
contradiction in math to find a method of resisting the addicted paralysis that dominates 
contemporary America. He constructs an opposition between the circular structure of 
addiction and the dialectical structure of pure mathematics. He sees in mathematics a 
model for the posthumanist transcendence of virtual solipsism. 
Infinite Jest finds addiction everywhere and to everything. Wallace is interested not 
only in chemical dependence, but also in the psychological dependencies that can attach 
to any enjoyment. The two principal settings of the novel are the Ennet House Drug and 
Alcohol Recovery House—"redundancy sic" (995n49)—and Enfield Tennis Academy, or 
E.T.A., an athletically and academically prestigious boarding school. One of the novel's 
two protagonists is Hal Incandenza, the youngest son of the Academy's founders and a 
star pupil there in his own right. Wallace introduces the culture of substance abuse at 
E.T.A. well before Ennet house even appears. He catalogues with extensive 
pharmaceutical jargon the drugs Hal and his peer enjoy (984n8-9). Wallace describes the 
teenage recreational drug user's aim: 
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to basically short out the whole motherboard and blow out all the circuits and 
slowly recover and be almost neurologically reborn and start the gradual cycle all 
over again… this circular routine, if your basic wiring's OK to begin with, can 
work surprisingly well throughout adolescence and sometimes into one's like 
early twenties, before it starts to creep up on you. (53)  
The circularity of this process prevents escape; through 'rebirth,' the user returns to the 
same place where he first felt the need for the substance. The metaphor of brain as 
motherboard, a quintessential metaphor of the posthumanist age, suggests the mind's 
capacity for crashes, bugs, and syntactical errors that corner the processor with an 
incomputable problem. The drug creates an opportunity to reboot, be born again; second 
birth begins a 'new' life that travels the same circular path.  
Amidst the defamiliarizing flood of technical jargon, this circular structure emerges 
as the true form of addiction in the broader, nonchemical sense. The identity of the drug 
is not essential to this cycle. Wallace observes that just about any object of our attention 
can be a venue for circular annihilation and reconstitution of the self: 
Some persons can give themselves away to an ambitious pursuit and have that be 
all the giving-themselves-away-to-something they need to do. Though sometimes 
this changes as the players get older and the pursuit more stress-fraught. 
American experience seems to suggest that people are virtually unlimited in their 
need to give themselves away, on various levels. Some just prefer to do it in 
secret. (53) 
Here giving the self away is the addictive act. For many addicts, including Hal, secrecy is 
the key to enjoyment. Hal smokes marijuana in secret in the tunnels under E.T.A., a habit 
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that revolves around "the bigger secret… that he's as attached to the secrecy as he is to 
getting high" (49). But the enjoyment of secrecy preserves the self, undermining the act 
of giving the self away. Significantly, Wallace notes a need to give the self away, not an 
ability to do so; any secret destruction of the self simultaneously edifies a kernel of that 
self by granting it privileged knowledge of its own action. Thus the 'sacrifice' of the 
American addict is derailed by secret enjoyment. The circle is evidence of the sacrifice's 
falsity: The self returns, not sacrificed but rather more fortified than ever and eager to 
repeat the cycle. 
The insidious dynamic of the self-feeding circle is everywhere. When Hal gets high, 
he holds the smoke in his lungs long enough that he exhales hardly any of it. His 
principle, "Total utilization of available resources = lack of publicly detectable waste" 
(49), points ironically to the airborne garbage capsules that the government in Infinite 
Jest launches daily over Boston up to a fictional wasteland called the Great Concavity. 
The logic of this equation depends on a conflation of resources and waste. To eliminate 
waste, one must not just consume the resources, but consume the waste. For Hal, 
resources and waste coincide in smoke; it is both the object of consumption and the 
incriminating evidence of indulgence. This principle of waste as a resource is the concept 
underlying E.T.A. founder (and father of Hal) James Incandenza's theory of 'annular 
fusion.' Before he founds a tennis academy, James is a prominent scientist. He develops a 
method of energy production that creates waste that is in turn fuel for further energy 
production. Annular fusion provides the world of Infinite Jest with infinite sustainable 
power, but it also immediately destroys a vast region of land, now the Great Concavity, 
and over the course of the novel the societal consequences of that destruction creep 
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across the rest of the continent. James, for all his apparent success in several careers, is 
Wallace's embodiment of a failed life. His sons refer to him as "Himself," which as 
Hayles notes "[acknowledges] the man is so inward-bent that any nominative referring to 
him must include an intensifier of selfhood" (689). In addition to science and tennis, he 
has a long career in filmmaking. His filmography, which Wallace presents in its entirety 
with academic formality, is one extended exercise in self-reference (985-993n24). It 
culminates in "Infinite Jest (V?)," a mysterious film so entertaining it literally kills 
anybody who watches it, rendering them incapable of turning away from the screen even 
long enough to eat or go to the bathroom. The sad irony is that Wallace indicates James' 
intention was to create "something so bloody compelling it would reverse thrust on a 
young self's fall into the womb of solipsism" (839). Instead, his entertainment accelerates 
that fall. Viewers die watching a film on repeat, endlessly traversing a circle in a virtual 
realm of entertainment, severed from the world outside.  
Hal seems at least vaguely suspicious of these circular processes. He notices the 
peculiar importance he places on secrecy, and he tries to understand the structure of his 
dependence, but his musings are always impaired: 
He broods on it abstractly sometimes, when high: this No-One Must-Know thing. 
It's not fear per se, fear of discovery. Beyond that it all gets too abstract and 
twined up to lead to anything, Hal's brooding. Like most North Americans of his 
generation, Hal tends to know way less about why he feels certain ways about the 
objects and pursuits he's devoted to then he does about the objects and pursuits 
themselves. It's hard to say for sure whether this is even exceptionally bad, this 
tendency. (54) 
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Hal knows secrecy serves a function deeper than protection from getting in trouble, but 
he falls into hopeless abstraction when he tries to discover what that function is. His 
confusion appears in a complicated light: Wallace sees danger in Hal's ignorance of his 
own addiction's workings, but he also mistrusts excessive attention to the self. Zadie 
Smith, in an insightful essay about Wallace, notes the suggestion in his work that "too 
much awareness—particularly self-awareness—has allowed us to be less responsible than 
ever" (266). Hal is always stoned when he considers his need for secrecy, and Wallace 
comments elsewhere in Infinite Jest on the impotence of "marijuana thinking… a 
paralytic thought-helix" (335). Hal's high ponderings are a conceit through which 
Wallace poses serious questions and abandons them in exasperation. He exposes the 
dangers of self-awareness by painting Hal's narcotized paralysis as a result of abstract 
introspection. But the question remains important. The problem is how to practice 
reflection without turning irrecoverably inward. 
In Everything and More, Wallace identifies the Vicious Circle as the paradox that 
threatens to derail promising mathematical theories. He cites Bertrand Russell's famous 
natural language version of the Vicious Circle: "Imagine a barber who shaves all and 
only those who do not shave themselves—does this barber shave himself or not?" 
(278n78). If yes, then he must satisfy the stated condition of being a man who does not 
shave himself, although we just said that he does. If we say he does not shave himself, 
then he satisfies the condition and thus does shave himself, even though we just said that 
he does not. Either answer leads to a contradiction. The barber illustrates Russell's 
Antimony, which asks the same question about abstract sets: Consider the set of all sets 
that do not contain themselves as members; call this set N. Is N a member of itself? 
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Again, we cannot answer without implying a contradiction. Wallace describes the 
impasse of the Vicious Circle as the occasion when "it becomes logically impossible to 
do something we're logically required to do" (278). This sentence could, with a different 
adverb in place of 'logically,' describe any of the psychic circles in Infinite Jest. For 
example: It becomes emotionally impossible to do something we're emotionally required 
to do—such as walk away from a fatally entertaining film. It becomes psychologically 
impossible for Hal to understand his own addiction to secrecy. Instead, he falls into the 
Vicious Circle, indulging in the private interruption of the self that returns him to the 
same position of dependence every time, never facing his own condition. 
Wallace follows modern math as it answers and escapes the Vicious Circle, indicating 
that he sees a possibility of deliverance from analogous psychological circles. Everything 
and More tells the history of mathematics, interpreting the entire story as a dialectic 
centered about the problematic concept of infinity. Georg Cantor, the founder of set 
theory and transfinite arithmetic, emerges as the hero of Wallace's narrative. Wallace 
quotes Cantor elaborating his notion of derived sets: "We see here a dialectic generation 
of concepts, which leads further and further, and thus remains in itself necessary and 
consequently free of any arbitrariness" (242). Cantor refers to a well-defined process by 
which the points 'infinitely' close to a set (points that may be part of the set or may 
themselves be absent from it) constitute a new set, the 'derived set.' I intend to avoid as 
much as possible digressing into the technical details of the math at play here, but I do 
wish to illuminate a certain detail that Wallace especially emphasizes. Cantor's crucial 
insight is that this process can be iterated more than infinitely many times, in a sense. Let 
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us start with a set of points, which we call P.1 By taking the derived set of P, then the 
derived set of that set, and so on repeatedly, we construct sets named P(1), P(2), P(3), … 
etc. A certain well-defined set of points will be included in every derived set, no matter 
how many times we repeat the process. Thus it makes sense to call this set P(∞). It is the 
set that would be left if we were to take the derived set of P literally 'infinity times.' 
Though we cannot perform infinitely many derivations, we can nonetheless coherently 
articulate the definite result of infinite derivations. But then we can take a derived set of 
P(∞) as well, leading us to construct the sets 
P(∞+1), P(∞+2), P(∞+3), … , P(2∞), P(2∞+1), P(2∞+2),  … , P(3∞), … 
And so on. Each of these sets is well defined and distinct from the others, so the numbers 
of iterations (∞, ∞+1, ∞+2, and so on) really do describe different infinite numbers in a 
meaningful sense. It is even possible to prove rigorously (as Cantor did) that these 
infinite 'numbers' are subject to their own consistent laws of addition and multiplication. 
Thus, though they are horrifically abstract, it does make sense to consider these different 
infinities as actual numbers. Cantor devoted much of his career to studying these 
'transfinite numbers' and the different ways a set can be infinite. Wallace's interest in 
Cantor's work is already explicit in Infinite Jest, when he uses the word 'Cantorian' to 
describe the infinite possibilities inherent in tennis, and then explains in an endnote that 
Cantor was "the man who proved some infinities were bigger than other infinites" (82, 
994n35). The counterintuitive discovery that there exist fundamentally different infinities 
fascinates Wallace. North's conception of a 'good infinity' opposed to a 'bad infinity' 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 P must satisfy certain requirements for this argument to hold, but I will not reproduce 
all the details of the construction here. In general, I present only as much of the math as 
seems necessary to illustrate the notion of 'different infinites.' For a more thorough 
presentation, see Everything and More and also Cantor's Contributions. 
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misses Wallace's point because it is the very notion of multiple infinities that Wallace 
celebrates, not one particular infinity over another. To Wallace, the threat is the 
stagnation math faced before Cantor argued for a rigorous theory of infinite sets, which 
theory created the context in which it became possible even to talk about different 
infinites. 
More broadly, Wallace describes the structure of mathematical progress: "certain 
paradoxes give rise to conceptual advances that can handle those original paradoxes but 
in turn give rise to new paradoxes, which then generate further conceptual advances, and 
so on" (Everything 278). With paradox comes conflict, and Wallace interprets these 
conflicts as expressions of different underlying ideas of mathematical reality. "The 
modern wrangle over math's procedures," says Wallace, "is ultimately a dispute over the 
ontological status of math entities" (282). For Wallace, this ontology seems to be both a 
matter of interest and a mental hazard. He contemplates: 
The integers never stop; there is no end. Does the set of all integers compose a 
real ∞? Or are the integers themselves not really real but just abstractions; plus 
what exactly is a set, and are sets real or just conceptual devices, etc.? Or are 
maybe integers and/or sets only 'mathematically real' as opposed to really real, 
and what exactly is the difference, and might we want to grant ∞ a certain 
mathematical reality but not the other kind (assuming there's only one other 
kind)? And at what point do the questions get so abstract and the distinctions so 
fine and the cephalalgia so bad that we simply can't handle thinking about any of 
it anymore? (21) 
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Asking what it means for a math entity to be 'real' can be paralyzing, as outside of pure 
Platonism it admits of no satisfying final answer. But this question also leads to the 
productive paradoxes of mathematical dialectic; it is unanswerable, but it is the occasion 
for a deliverance of sorts. As math develops, each paradox forces new definitions and 
concepts, until the paradox is tamed and becomes something "many working 
mathematicians now don't worry too much about in the course of their day-to-day work" 
(284n91). In the place of paradox emerges a more nuanced concept that escapes the 
Vicious Circle of the initial contradiction. 
The progress of mathematics would be irrelevant, however, were it to inform only the 
technicians' theory. When Wallace asks, "Do we really want to say that ∞ exists only in 
the way that unicorns do?" (21), it is essential that he frames the question in terms of 
what we want. Wallace considers the ontology of infinity on behalf of a community with 
something at stake. Wallace is not a mathematician, nor is his audience highly trained in 
math. Still he situates Everything and More in a conversation that is somehow invested in 
the reality of math. The question of what is real, Wallace implies, is urgent for all of us. 
Wallace alludes to the urgency of this dialectic in Infinite Jest, suggesting that it may 
apply to structures more immediate than abstract math. The intense German Head Coach 
and Athletic Director of E.T.A., Gerhardt Schtitt, is a foil to almost every character in the 
novel. Wallace depicts the friendship between Schtitt and the other character who is 
unlike the general population of Infinite Jest, gentle, naïve middle-child Mario 
Incandenza. Mario is severely physically and mentally handicapped, so he is neither an 
athlete nor a student at E.T.A. He is, however, a budding filmmaker, and he helps Schtitt 
by filming all of E.T.A.'s players. Schtitt confides in Mario his frustration with the 
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American "myth of efficiency." It is "An efficiency of Euclid only: flat. […] The story 
that the shortest way between two places is the straight line" (80). Schtitt speaks here 
against a principle that drives almost every other character in the novel. Hal, for example, 
smokes his marijuana in a one-hitter because it has "the advantage of efficiency" (49). 
Although Wallace states that Schtitt knows as much math as a "Taiwanese 
kindergartener," the head coach does refute efficiency in the language of math (82). He 
knows enough to understand that Euclid represents flat space and straight lines, the 
easiest and most obvious ways of thinking geometry. Schtitt rejects movement in a 
straight line, asking "And how many two places are there without there is something in 
the way between them, if you go?" (81). Schtitt insists that real development is always 
against obstacles—gesturing toward a crude version of the dialectic active in 
mathematical development. 
Wallace describes Schtitt as holding "certain permanent values which—yes, OK, 
granted—may, admittedly, have a whiff of proto-fascist potential about them, but which 
do, nevertheless (the values), anchor nicely the soul and course of a life" (82). The many 
equivocatory modifiers preceding the reluctant concession "fascist" reveal Wallace's 
discomfort with the complicated implications of these values. Schtitt believes that junior 
athletics is "about learning to sacrifice the hot narrow imperatives of the Self… to the 
larger imperatives of a team (OK, the State)" (82). For Schtitt, self-sacrifice is not the 
circular, secret reaffirmation of the self that recreational drug users practice. Circular 
sacrifice is about meeting that virtually unlimited need to give the self away, a need that 
belongs to the self ostensibly being given away. Schtitt advocates self-sacrifice that is 
about surrender, which meets a need outside of the self. It is truly sacrifice of the self, not 
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for the self. The danger in this philosophy is that the larger system, if chosen incorrectly, 
can be more dangerous than the self—the fascist State being exemplary. But in 
contemporary America, "the State is not a team or a code, but a sort of sloppy 
intersection of desires and fears, where the only public consensus a boy must surrender to 
is the acknowledged primacy of straight-line pursuing this flat and short-sighted idea of 
personal happiness" (83). Schtitt insists that we need something bigger than ourselves, 
telling Mario, "Any something. The what: this is more unimportant than that there is 
something" (83). Here Schtitt sounds similar to Wallace himself in a commencement 
speech to the Kenyon College class of 2005. Wallace tells the graduates, "In the day-to-
day trenches of adult life, there is actually no such thing as atheism. There is no such 
thing as not worshipping. Everybody worships. The only choice we get is what to 
worship" ("David"). Wallace's discomfort with the fascist tones of Schtitt's thought arises 
from his desire to endorse them in a non-fascist way. Wallace even describes the students' 
opinion of Schtitt in terms that he must realize apply well to Infinite Jest itself: "probably 
bats, [and] w/o doubt mind-looseningly discursive" (81). Schtitt represents analytic 
thought that moves erratically towards some form of devotion, and he appears heroic in 
his rejection of "the happy pleasure of the person alone" (83). He acknowledges a need 
for the conflicts that move a life forward, for the challenges that pull one out of 
comfortable paralysis. 
Schtitt also resembles Wallace in his taste for mathematical language. Without any 
formal knowledge of math, he still sees it underlying the aesthetics of tennis: 
Schtitt approached competitive tennis more like a pure mathematician than a 
technician… knew that real tennis was really about not the blend of statistical 
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order and expansive potential that the game's technicians revered, but in fact the 
opposite—not-order, limit, the places where things broke down, fragmented into 
beauty. (81) 
There is no irony when Schtitt points toward a mathematical interpretation of tennis; this 
is the interpretation Wallace himself favors in his essays.2 He relates it to his commitment 
to dialectic, signaling to a model of sacrifice that appears more powerful than the addict's 
circular short circuit. One day, Schtitt expounds his beliefs to Mario over ice cream 
cones: 
The true opponent, the enfolding boundary, is the player himself… You seek to 
vanquish and transcend the limited self whose limits make the game possible in 
the first place… junior athletics is but one facet of the real gem: life's endless war 
against the self you cannot live without. (84) 
Mario listens and wonders, "What's the difference between tennis and suicide, life and 
death, the game and its own end?" (84). Schtitt answers "Not different… except the 
chance to play" (84), then erupts with laughter. Mario also laughs, spilling some of ice 
cream. This warm moment of friendship emphasizes the sincerity of the scene. Despite 
the comedy of Schtitt's clumsy English and parodic intensity as a coach, Wallace appears 
to endorse his philosophy, a dialectic philosophy that values discipline and sacrifice over 
immediate happiness. Schtitt's struggle against the self stands in opposition to Hal's 
secrecy and the general solipsism it represents. But Schtitt is a flat character; he is a 
source of jokes and a mouthpiece for important ideas, but it is not his fate that concerns 
the novel. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See in particular "Derivative Sport in Tornado Alley" in the collection A Supposedly 
Fun Thing I'll Never Do Again. 
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Hal is the character we first invest in. He narrates the captivating first scene, in which 
we see that he has fallen into a dark solipsism. He sits quietly in an office for a college 
interview, while E.T.A. staff speak on his behalf. The University deans become 
increasingly frustrated that Hal does not speak for himself, until finally Hal feels forced 
to say something: 
My application's not bought… I am not just a boy who plays tennis. I have an 
intricate history. Experiences and feelings. I'm complex. I read… I feel and 
believe. I have opinions. Some of them are interesting. I could, if you'd let me, 
talk and talk. Let's talk about anything. (12) 
He goes on to rattle off his specific thoughts about several major philosophers—yet 
something is wrong with Hal's impassioned speech. The deans respond in horror and 
struggle to restrain him. It becomes clear that Hal is merely imagining this moment of 
articulate speech. In reality, he cannot speak intelligibly, cannot even control his own 
body when he tries to communicate. His solipsism is not skepticism of the world's 
existence, but rather an inability to engage the world—in a sense it is skepticism of the 
world's relevance to the self. As desperately as Hal wants to communicate, his motivation 
is to demonstrate his own ideas, not to learn anything from the world.  
This first scene is chronologically the last in the novel, and still a year later than the 
next latest. The reader spends the rest of the book wondering how Hal ends up in such a 
state. Wallace offers hints but no definite answer. One of the ideas Hal announces, 
incomprehensible to the world outside him, is "I believe, with Hegel, that transcendence 
is absorption" (12). But Hal has emphatically not transcended the self. Rather he is 
entirely lost to it. Infinite Jest goes on to chronicle Hal's failure to transcend solipsism. 
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Abstraction is the crucial point of potential for Wallace. It can lead to productive 
paradox as in the dialectic development of math, or it can spiral into a Vicious Circle. 
Wallace creates an absurd theater of abstraction in the game Eschaton, a cult favorite at 
E.T.A. that captures kids "in the very earliest stages of puberty and really abstract-
capable thought" (321). Eschaton takes four adjacent tennis courts for a map of the world 
and 400 old tennis balls for nuclear warheads, which the 'game-master' distributes 
unevenly among about ten players according to an algorithm. As the name suggests, the 
game involves eventual nuclear apocalypse as players lob tennis ball warheads at each 
other's cities on the tennis court map of the world. However, the core of the game is not 
gleeful bombing but cautious diplomacy, conducted according to the simulations and 
statistics that a sophisticated computer program generates before and during the game. 
The Eschaton episode subjects the reader to a dozen pages of heavily jargonized 
description of a rather tedious game before things start to unravel in comic payoff. 
Wallace notes that if adults were to watch, they would "find an actual game of Eschaton 
strangely subdued, almost narcotized-looking," as the "devotees become, on court, almost 
parodically adult" (327). While the young players become parodic adults, the older kids 
watching the game become parodically geriatric, not just narcotized-looking but actually 
narcotized by the joint they pass around. Again, Wallace is ambivalent about Hal as a 
narcotized subject. Hal is a perceptive observer, but when he locates the essential 
question in the game, he fails to absorb its paradox and act. 
Eschaton constructs a complete abstract world. Wallace unsubtly names the character 
Otis P. Lord (often called just O. Lord) who "more or less [has] to play God"—but he is 
God of a virtual world (328). Before he declares the significance of any event, he must 
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consult the computer that runs the game and then announce its statistical analysis of the 
players' moves. The major figures and quantities in the game have only the abbreviated, 
all-caps labels of the program's syntax; The game's favorable points are called 
"INDDIR,"—short for "Infliction of Death, Destruction, and Incapacitation of Response." 
In this case, abbreviation seems natural, and similarly for the negative points, 
"SUFDDIR." But the kids also adopt the computer's codes for the players, for example 
"REDCHI" instead of just China (322-324). By speaking in defamiliarizing code, they 
accentuate the game's virtuality. When they fail to defer to the computer in other ways, 
the game begins to degenerate. While Lord runs a proposed treaty through the computer 
program to determine whether the agreement two players have reached is plausible in the 
game's virtual world, a third player, REDCHI, lobs a warhead at the T-shirt representing 
INDPAK's Karachi on the tennis court map. Lord does not see the warhead land, and 
controversy ensues: 
It's an uneasy moment: a dispute such as this would never occur in the real God's 
real world... But God here is played by Otis P. Lord, and Lord is number-
crunching so fiendishly… that he can't even pretend to have seen where 
REDCHI's strike against INDPAK landed w/ respect to Karachi's T-shirt… and in 
his lapse of omniscience cannot see how he's supposed to allocate the relevant 
INDDIR- and SUFDDIR-points. (333) 
Eschaton's virtual world draws its God into a matrix of data that obscures his vision of his 
own domain. Only in a virtual world can there be a dispute about whether a warhead hit a 
given city—in a simulated war, destruction is not real damage, it is just one possible state 
for the system. 
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Lord tries to establish the effect of the Karachi warhead, which requires him to 
calculate fallout conditions based on weather and geography in the simulated world. 
While he is running the program, it begins to snow.  Some players suggest that the snow 
would affect the spread of radioactive fallout, and thus Lord needs to adjust the 
computations. But is this actual snow part of Eschaton's virtual world? Michael Pemulis, 
the school's all-time greatest Eschaton player, now retired watching from the sidelines, is 
furious at this suggestion: "It's snowing on the goddamn map, not the territory, you dick!" 
(333). The map is both a real, physically present artifact and an abstract rendering of 
imagined spaces in the virtual reality of the game. The snow controversy exposes the 
ambiguous relation between different levels of abstraction, different realities. Pemulis 
insists that the snow is not assigned to map anything in the virtual world, so it cannot be 
real in that virtual world. But the disastrous outcome of this game proves that the disorder 
of the real world can violently invade the ordered abstraction of the game. Pemulis 
insists, "Eschaton gentlemen is about logic and axiom and mathematical probity and 
discipline and verity and order. You do not get points for hitting anybody real. Only the 
gear that maps what's real" (338). By "anybody real," he means the real players who 
stand on the court. But when he says, "the gear that maps what's real," then "real" means 
precisely unreal, since the gear is materially real. The virtual world of the game becomes 
'real.' The very real tennis gear is then in this context not 'real' because it functions as a 
representation. 
Hal watches as Eschaton unfolds, uncharacteristically getting high socially. He steps 
out of his budding solipsism, enjoying his drug communally rather than secretly, 
temporarily breaking the circle of his habit. He locates a point of interest in a game that 
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never interested him much as a kid. Hal "finds the real-snow/unreal-snow snag in the 
Eschaton extremely abstract but somehow way more interesting than the Eschaton itself" 
(335). The snag arises out of the unstable difference between reality and representation. 
Underlying this ambiguity is the impossibility of fixing one level as 'real.' As in the 
mathematics that Pemulis cites as Eschaton's foundation, reality is an elusive concept. 
The distinction between being real and mapping something real relates to the idea 
Wallace ponders in Everything and More: maybe there are multiple types of 'real'—and 
maybe none of them is privileged. This difficulty fascinates Wallace, but he is also 
nervous about considering it too seriously. He asks these questions through a Hal 
paralyzed by marijuana, who struggles unproductively with the various levels of reality 
he perceives. His struggle suggests that maybe these questions lack definite answers. 
Wallace declares in Everything and More, "The ability to halt a line of abstract thinking 
once you see it has no end is part of what usually distinguishes sane, functional people… 
from the unhinged" (17). The appropriate response would be that of mathematics: to 
exploit the ontological tension in order to arrive at a new, more useful conception of 
'real.' Where math uses paradox to advance, Hal loses himself in circular thinking, 
turning infinitely inward. 
In Infinite Jest, the competing 'kinds of real' lead not to development but to comic 
disaster. The young Eschaton players turn violent as they argue, and their game 
degenerates into a brawl that destroys the computer and seriously injures several kids. 
Only one of the older kids, Jim Troeltsch, feels any concern about the dangerous mess 
they are watching. He prods the others to react, but they sit paralyzed by the horrifically 
entertaining scene in front of them: 
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Hal reflects that he does feel a certain sort of intense anxiety, but can't sort 
through the almost infinite-seeming implications of what Troeltsch is saying fast 
enough to determine whether the anxiety is over something about what he's seeing 
or something in connection between what Troeltsch is saying and the degree to 
which he's absorbed in what's going on outside the fence, which is a degenerative 
chaos so complex in its disorder that it's hard to tell whether it seems 
choreographed or simply chaotically disordered. LaMont Chu is throwing up into 
the Indian Ocean (341). 
This last sentence eschews all previous deliberation about levels of abstraction and 
accepts the virtuality of the game as reality, stating that LaMont Chu is literally vomiting 
into the territory mapped by the courts. But Hal has discovered a second question beneath 
that of the ontology of the map. Is the scene ordered or chaotic? Wallace has spent 
several page-length paragraphs boring us with the structure of the game, but in his 
narcotized stupor, Hal perceives that that structure might be breaking; it might be 
possible to transcend. We recall Schtitt's theory of tennis, which celebrates precisely the 
moments when order fails. Were order stable, the boy LaMont would not exist at the 
same level of abstraction as the Indian Ocean; he would need to vomit onto a tennis 
court. But the lines between 'kinds of real' fall apart, and the map and territory collide. 
Their collision is comic and strangely beautiful despite causing real harm. 
Wallace's language describing Eschaton—"the parabaloid transcontinental flight of a 
liquid-fuel strategic delivery vehicle closely resembles a topspin lob" (324)—recalls the 
poetry of the parabola and the rocket in Gravity's Rainbow, but links it to tennis. 
Wallace's diction nods to Pynchon: Lord sprints, "trying to save hardware that's now at 
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the top of its rainbow's arc" (342). A computer, the computer that holds Eschaton and is 
thus the symbol of abstraction, takes the place of Pynchon's Rocket 000000. Like the 
rocket in Gravity's Rainbow, abstraction is a dangerous thing with a religious sort of 
beauty. The rocket is the twentieth century symbol of Eschaton—horrifically potent but 
somehow gorgeous to Pynchon's characters in its devastation. In Gravity's Rainbow, 
characters pursue the rocket to their own annihilation. Rocketman seems simply to 
dissolve at the end of his quest; his world is left to wonder if he was real. The twenty-first 
century sees the rise of the posthumanist symbol of destruction, the computer. It threatens 
to annihilate reality by converting it to simulation and information. It would be useless to 
cry out against this symbol; it already arcs parabolically above us. The difference is that 
the violence of the computer is virtual. In Infinite Jest, Hal is annihilated as an actor, but 
preserved as an observer. The world exists for Hal only as virtual reality entertainment, 
not as a real context in which he can live as a human subject. 
In Eschaton, the distinction between levels of abstraction and reality collapses, 
sending Lord's head flying through the computer screen. Hal can only watch; he does not 
intervene to prevent the younger students he supposedly mentors from injuring 
themselves over an abstract argument. Order fragments into comic beauty, and in the 
confrontation between different 'types of real' there is a potential for transcendence, but it 
goes unrealized. The paradox of real/unreal snow leads Hal not to a personal conceptual 
advance, but to internal circular thinking and a catastrophe of external violence. 
Giles finds Wallace's thought centered around the "interface between the human and 
the machine, between spirit and technology" which leads to "intriguing dialectics 
between a discourse of dehumanization, which defamiliarizes the human body and 
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represents it cartographically, and a nostalgia for more traditional forms of identity" 
(335). It is indeed a dialectical confrontation, but the dialectic is not always actualized. In 
Wallace's first novel, The Broom of the System, a character says "You can't think of your 
own act of thinking-of, any more than a blade can cut itself, right? Unless you're the guy 
who's significantly lowering Nervous Roy Keller's quality of life [i.e. Hegel, the subject 
of a paper Roy is finding very difficult to write]" (247). To Wallace, Hegelian dialectic is 
an elusive ideal. Mathematics is indispensible because in its history we see dialectic 
achieved. In real life, too much reflection, attempting to cut through the inherent, internal 
paradoxes of the self, is an endless circle. Wallace sees math as a site of realized 
transcendence. It has absorbed the disruptive contradictions of infinity; its definitions of 
'real' have developed to be more stable than ever, though never finally fixed. Were Hal to 
absorb the impasse of the dissolving 'kinds of real,' he could transcend their 
contradictions and intervene, preventing the young combatants from destroying 
themselves on behalf of underdeveloped abstract concepts. Instead he sits still. Physically 
he is with his friends but psychologically he is stoned in utter solitude, as always. The 
Eschaton game is Hal's ultimate missed opportunity, an unrealized parallel to the great 
triumph of mathematics. 
Infinite Jest is then a novel about missed opportunities and unrealized potential. The 
retrospective relevance of this theme to Wallace's own story is clear and painful. But the 
picture of the unrealized in Infinite Jest is a source of hope as well. At what can only be 
the infancy of the posthumanist age, Wallace offers us an outline of how we might absorb 
and thus transcend the collapsing concepts and definitions of a suddenly obsolete reality. 
To borrow Giles' words, Wallace enacts a "humanization of the digital sensibility" (336). 
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Specifically in mathematics he finds a model for what it might mean to live in the new 
age of virtuality without living inwardly. It is, as Wallace once told a crowd of new 
college graduates and their families, "unimaginably hard to do this, to stay conscious and 
alive, day in and day out." 
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